

Nathaniel Sharadin

Department of Philosophy
The University of Hong Kong
natesharadin@gmail.com
sharadin.com

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Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Ethical Theory, Epistemology

Areas of Competence

Applied Ethics, Social & Political Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Action, Pragmatism

Academic Employment

- Assistant Professor, The University of Hong Kong, 2021–present.
- Assistant Professor, The College of New Jersey, 2018–2021.
- Allan and Anita Sutton Distinguished Faculty Fellow, Syracuse University, 2015–2018.
- Visiting Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University, 2014–2015.

Other Appointments

- Faculty Fellow (in residence), Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2024.
- Research Affiliate; Philosophy Fellow (in residence 2023), The Center for AI Safety, 2023–present.

Education

- Ph.D., Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014.
- M.A., Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010.
- M.A., Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 2008.
- B.A., Philosophy (Honors), Classics, University of Pittsburgh, 2006.

Publications

Books

- **Sharadin, N.** (2026). *Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Work*. Cambridge University Press.
- **Sharadin, N.** (2023). *Epistemic Instrumentalism Explained*. Routledge.

Journal Articles

- **Sharadin, N.** (forthcoming). Cognitive Enfeeblement By Design. *Synthese*.
- **Sharadin, N.** (2026). Extreme Cognitive Assistance and Open Futures. *Journal of*

- Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 31(4), 528–565.
- Nolan, V., Brown, M., Balch, J., Katukota, A., Abbas, S., Devaguptapu, P., Baskaran, N., Abbott, K., Hong, P., Shickel, B., Efron, P., Upchurch, G., Bihorac, A., **Sharadin, N.**, Tignanelli, C., Moseley, R., & Loftus, T. (2026). Language models for value-informed proxy decision support. *NEJM AI*.
 - Harding, J., & **Sharadin, N.** (2025). What is it for a Machine Learning Model to Have a Capability? *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2025). Promotionalism, Orthogonality, and Instrumental Convergence. *Philosophical Studies*, 182(7), 1725–1755.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2025). Predicting and Preferring. *Inquiry*, 68(4), 1121–1132.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2025). Morality First? *AI & Society*, 40(3), 1289–1301.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2025). Spot the Bot. *AI & Society*, 40(2), 1113–1115.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2024). Personalized Patient Preference Predictors are Neither Technically Feasible Nor Ethically Desirable. *American Journal of Bioethics*, 24(7), 62–65.
 - D'Alessandro, W., Lloyd, H., & **Sharadin, N.** (2023). Large Language Models and Biorisk. *American Journal of Bioethics*, 23(10), 115–118.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2021). Is Deontic Evaluation Capable of Doing What it is For? *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 19(3).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2021). Ecumenical Epistemic Instrumentalism. *Synthese*, 198, 2613–2639.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2019). Should Aggregate Patient Preference Data Be Used to Make Decisions on Behalf of Unrepresented Patients? *AMA Journal of Ethics*, 21(7), 566–574.
 - **Sharadin, N.**, & Dellsén, F. (2019). Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit. *Philosophical Studies*, 176(5), 1263–1290.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2019). Consequentialism & Moral Worth. *Utilitas*, 31(2), 117–136.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2018). Two Problems for Accepting as Intending. *Ethics*, 128(3).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2018). Patient Preference Predictors and the Problem of Naked Statistical Evidence. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 44(12), 857–862.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2018). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Reason to Believe in Accord with the Evidence. *Synthese*, 195(9), 3791–3809.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2018). Rational Coherence in Environmental Policy: Paris, Montreal, and Kigali. *Ethics, Policy, & Environment*, 21(1), 4–8.
 - Dellsén, F., & **Sharadin, N.** (2017). The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass. *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, 3(2), 209–226.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2017). In Defense of Comic Pluralism. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 20(2), 375–392.
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2017). A Partial Defense of Permissivism. *Ratio*, 30(1).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2016). Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims. *Utilitas*, 28(3).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2016). Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion. *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*, 10(1).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2016). Nothing but the Evidential Considerations? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 94(2).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2015). Problems for Pure Probabilism about Promotion (And A Disjunctive Alternative). *Philosophical Studies*, 172(5).
 - **Sharadin, N.** (2015). Reasons and Promotion. *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous*, 25(1).

- **Sharadin, N.** (2015). How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting. *Res Philosophica*, 92(2).
- **Sharadin, N.** (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 96(2).
- **Sharadin, N.** (2015). On Durant Drake's "May Belief Outstrip Evidence?" *Ethics*, 125(2).
- **Sharadin, N.** (2013). Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes. *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*, 7(3).

Chapters in Edited Volumes

- **Sharadin, N.** (2025). Depression and Suicide. In M. Cholbi & P. Stellino (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Suicide*.
- **Sharadin, N.** (2022). Patient Preference Predictors and Paternalism in Military Medicine. In *Health Care in Contexts of Risk, Uncertainty, and Hybridity* (pp. 101–114). Springer.
- **Sharadin, N.** (2019). Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate. In R. McKenna & C. Kyriacou (Eds.), *Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism* (pp. 121–143).

Book Reviews

- **Sharadin, N.** (2023). Review of *The Range of Reasons*, by Daniel Whiting (Oxford University Press). *Ethics*.
- **Sharadin, N.** (2020). Review of *Epistemic Consequentialism*, K. Ahlstrom-Vij & J. Dunn (Eds.) (Oxford University Press). *Utilitas*.
- **Sharadin, N.** (2015). Review of *Motivational Internalism*, G. Björnsson et al. (Eds.) (Oxford University Press). *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

Selected Research Fellowships & Grants (Since 2015)

Values in original award currency, noted (e.g. HKD).

- "Artificial Achievements and Machine Learning Capabilities." Principal Investigator. General Research Fund (GRF), Research Grants Council, Hong Kong (RGC Project No. 17604824). 2025–2028 (36 months). Value: HKD 304,157.
- Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Studies, Faculty Fellowship, 2024–2025. Value: USD 75,000.
- Effective Ventures Foundation, Long Term Future Fund, East/West AI Safety work, 2024–2025. Value: USD 50,000.
- CAIS Philosophy Fellow, Center for AI Safety, 2023. Value: USD 80,000.
- "Explaining Epistemic Authority." Principal Investigator. General Research Fund (GRF), Research Grants Council, Hong Kong (RGC Project No. 17602622). 2023–2025 (24 months). Value: HKD 250,000.
- "Money and Markets" Teaching Development Grant (TDG), 2023–2024. Value: HKD 78,000.
- HKU Research Development Funding, startup grant, 2021–2023. Value: USD 32,000.
- GPPC Grant (×2), 2020, 2022. Value: USD 4,000 each.
- ICMM World Congress Grant, May 2019. Value: CHF 6,000.

- The Allan and Anita Sutton Distinguished Faculty Fellowship, 2015–2018. Value: USD 150,000.

Selected Presentations

- Comments on Murray Shanahan (title TBD), *Minds, Meaning, and Machines: New Work in Philosophy of AI*, November 2026.
- Comments on Daniel Wodak’s “Equal Influence,” Dartmouth Philosophy of Law Workshop, July 2026.
- “The Slavish Labor of Self-Governance,” University of Iceland Institute of Philosophy, June 2026.
- “The Slavish Labor of Self-Governance,” Institute of Philosophy, London, May 2026.
- “The Ethics of Assistance,” National University of Singapore, February 2026.
- “The Economics of Assistance,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, October 2025.
- “Impractical Ethics” (comments on Keeling and Street’s *AI Welfare*, Cambridge), Symposium on *AI Welfare*, University of Hong Kong, September 2025.
- “The Baseline Argument for Cognitive Enfeeblement,” Lingnan University, September 2025.
- “The Predictable Consequences of Ubiquitous Cognitive Assistance,” University of Pennsylvania, April 2025.
- “The Predictable Consequences of Ubiquitous Cognitive Assistance,” Havana Workshop on Normative Philosophy, January 2025.
- “The Predictable Consequences of Ubiquitous Cognitive Assistance,” University of Notre Dame, September 2024.
- “Coopting Artificial Achievement,” PIBBSS Research Group, University of Cincinnati, December 2023.
- “Making AI Safe,” South China Normal University, December 2023.
- “Epistemic Instrumentalism and Encroachment,” National Taipei University, November 2023.
- “Coopting Artificial Achievement,” NYU Abu Dhabi, November 2023.
- “Coopting Artificial Achievement,” Hong Kong Catastrophic Risk Center Reading Group, November 2023.
- “Coopting Artificial Achievement,” AI & Humanity Lab AI Agency Workshop, November 2023.
- “Coopting Artificial Achievement,” Columbia River Ethics Workshop, August 2023.
- Comments on Gunnar Björnsson’s “Instrumental Reasons Without Difference Making,” SLACRR, May 2023.
- “Chronic Poverty and Skillful Deliberation,” Nanyang Technological University, March 2022.
- “Explaining Epistemic Authority,” Hong Kong University, April 2021.
- “Epistemic Instrumentalists Should Be Epistemic Ecologists,” Lingnan University, March 2021.
- “Epistemic Instrumentalists Should Be Epistemic Ecologists,” American Philosophical Association, Central Division, February 2021.
- Invited “Commentator at Large,” 5th Annual Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference (PeFEct5), November 2019.

- “Preference Prediction Under Fire,” 9th Annual ICMW Workshop on Military Medical Ethics, Basel, May 2019.
- Comments on Gwen Bradford’s “Uniqueness, Intrinsic Value, and Reasons,” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 2019.
- “Worrying about Formal Requirement,” Northeast Normativity Workshop, March 2019.
- Comments on Luke Kallberg’s “The Epistemology of Debating Well-Being,” American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, January 2019.
- “How to Promote a Desire,” The College of New Jersey, February 2018.
- “The Right Reason Problem,” Florida State University, January 2018.
- “What Different Kinds of Evaluation Are For,” Syracuse Ethics Workshop, Syracuse University, November 2017.
- “Three Puzzles about Reasons, One Solution,” Cardiff University, May 2017.
- “Two Problems for Accepting as Intending,” The Cottage Group, April 2017.
- Comments on Stephen White’s “Rational Commitment and Knowledge of Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 2017.
- “How Modal Variance in Match Affects Worth,” University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, August 2016.
- “How Modal Variance in Match Affects Worth,” National University of Singapore, June 2016.
- “How Modal Variance in Match Affects Worth,” Trinity College, Dublin, May 2016.
- “How Modal Variance in Match Affects Worth,” The Cottage Group, March 2016.
- “Epistemic Instrumentalism: The Objectivity Objection,” University of Chicago, February 2016.
- “Epistemic Instrumentalism: The Objectivity Objection,” CNY Ethics Reading Group, February 2016.
- “Epistemic Instrumentalism: The Objectivity Objection,” Virginia Tech, February 2016.
- “Conformationalism about Reasons,” College of William & Mary, January 2016.
- “Actualism & Possibilism in Epistemology,” University of Edinburgh, October 2015.
- “Actualism & Possibilism in Epistemology,” Syracuse University, October 2015.
- “Actualism & Possibilism in Epistemology,” University of Kent, Epistemic Consequentialism Conference, June 2015.
- “Actualism & Possibilism in Epistemology,” Bilkent University, June 2015.
- “Reasons Wrong and Right,” Lingnan University, February 2015.
- Comments on Teemu Toppinen’s “Rule Consequentialism (and Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates,” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 2015.
- Comments on “Virtue in Machine Ethics: An Approach Based on Evolutionary Computation,” American Philosophical Association, Central Division, February 2015.
- “Reasons Wrong and Right,” Ohio State University, January 2015.
- “Actualism & Possibilism in Epistemology,” Ohio State University, November 2014.
- “Problems for Pure Probabilism about Promotion,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, April 2014.
- “Research Ethics and Informed Consent,” Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, February 2014.
- “Reasons Wrong and Right,” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division

(respondent G. F. Schueler), March 2013.

- “Reasons Wrong and Right,” Princeton Philosophical Society, October 2012.
- “Reasons Wrong and Right,” GAP 8 Conference, Konstanz, September 2012.
- Comments on Zachary Miller’s “Strong Deontic Necessity,” Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME) V, August 2012.
- “A Defense of Permissivism,” King’s College London (respondent Corine Besson), May 2012.
- “Constitutivism about Norms,” Northwestern University, Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (respondent Seth Mayer), May 2012.
- “A Defense of Permissivism,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, November 2011.
- “Expressivism and Bifurcation,” University of Amsterdam, October 2011.
- “Constitutivism about Norms,” Arche/CSMN, Oslo (respondent Christel Fricke), November 2010.
- “Constitutivism about Norms,” King’s College London (respondent John Broome), March 2010.
- “How Does Whether P Settle Whether To Believe That P?,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 2010.
- “Can Expressivism Account for Moral Authority?,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, October 2008.
- “The Moral Mistake in National Identity,” University of San Francisco, August 2007.
- “Rawls’s Overlapping Consensus,” Minnesota State University, April 2007.
- “Rawls’s Overlapping Consensus,” Loyola University, Chicago, March 2007.

Supervision

- Weijia Zhang, HKU, PhD (supervisor), 2026–present.
- Kaicheng Fang, HKU, postdoctoral fellow, 2026–present.
- Jesse Hill, HKU, postdoctoral fellow, 2026–present.
- Xudong Zhang, HKU, MPhil (supervisor), 2024–2026. [Accepted PhD offer at Peking University]
- Nicole Dular, Syracuse University, PhD committee, 2017.
- Travis Timmerman, Syracuse University, PhD committee, 2016.

Teaching

*Grouped by institution. * denotes graduate teaching*

The University of Hong Kong (2021–present)

- AI & Work*, Spring 2027.
- Artificial Achievement & Human Flourishing, Fall 2025, Fall 2026.
- Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Fall 2025, Fall 2026.
- The Future of the Information Economy*, Spring 2026.
- Philosophy of AI Safety and Security*, Spring 2024, Spring 2026, Spring 2027.
- Benchmarking & Evaluating Artificial Systems Capabilities*, Spring 2024.
- Philosophy of Law, Fall 2021, Fall 2023; Spring 2027*.
- Theories of Morality, Fall 2021, Fall 2022.

- Probability in Epistemology & Ethics, Spring 2022.

The College of New Jersey (2018–2021)

- Topics in Philosophy, Spring 2021.
- Biomedical Ethics & Honors Biomedical Ethics, Spring 2019 (×2), Spring 2021 (×2).
- Political Philosophy & Honors Political Philosophy, Fall 2020 (×2).
- Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2019, Fall 2020.
- Environmental Ethics, Spring 2020.
- Independent Study in Ethics, Fall 2019.
- Honors Issues in Philosophy, Fall 2018 (×2), Fall 2019 (×2).
- Philosophy of Law, Fall 2018.

Syracuse University (2015–2018)

- Philosophy of Feminism, Spring 2018.
- Anti-Realism & Pragmatism in Ethics*, Spring 2018.
- Moral Theory, Fall 2017.
- Virtue Epistemology & Epistemic Justice*, Spring 2017.
- First Year Forum, Fall 2016.
- Philosophy of Art, Fall 2016.
- Environmental Ethics, Spring 2016.
- Epistemic Value & Normativity*, Fall 2015.

The Ohio State University (2014–2015)

- Reasons & Rationality*, Spring 2015.
- Theory of Knowledge, Spring 2015.
- Moral Philosophy, Fall 2014.
- Honors Introduction to Ethics, Fall 2014.

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (2010–2014)

- Political Philosophy: Rawls & His Critics, Summer 2014.
- Research Ethics*, Fall 2013.
- Bioethics, Fall 2010, Summer 2013 (×2).
- Introduction to Ethics and Metaethics, Summer 2012.
- Experience and Reality, Fall 2011.
- Ethics of Peace, War, and Defense, Summer 2010, Summer 2011 (×2).

Service

Editing

- Associate Editor, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2025–present.
- Associate Editor, *Inquiry*, 2022–present.
- Editor, PhilPapers (Area: Moral Irrealism; Leaf: Expressivism, Emotivism & Sentimentalism, Noncognitivism, Prescriptivism, Projectivism, Relativism, Subjectivism), 2010–present.

Refereeing

- Referee for *Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *Mind*, *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Synthese*, *Dialectica*, *Ergo*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Res Philosophica*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Dialogue*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Erkenntnis*, *Philosophia*, *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, *Inquiry*, *Noûs*, and Routledge, 2013–present.

Committee & Organizational Work

- Board of Studies, BASc, HKU, 2025–present.
- Co-founder, steering committee, Hong Kong Ethics Lab, 2024–present.
- Undergraduate Coordinator, Philosophy Department, HKU, 2025–present.
- Organizing committee, MA in AI, Ethics, and Society / PPE, 2023–present.
- Seminar Convenor, HKU–NUS–Lingnan Joint Speaker Series, 2021–2024.
- Chair (2019–2021) and member (2019–2021), Honors and Scholars Council, TCNJ.
- Mary Roebling International Travel Award Committee, TCNJ, 2018–2021.
- Faculty Advisor, TCNJ Philosophical Society, 2018–2021.
- Curriculum Committee, TCNJ, 2020–2021.
- Steering Committee and Program Committee, Alan Dawley Center for the Study of Social Justice, 2018–2021.

Other

- Co-Organizer, Northeast Normativity Workshop (×5, annual), 2019–2024.
- Organizer, annual AI-themed workshop in Hong Kong, 2023–present.
- Chair, Symposium on Epistemic Reasons, Eastern APA, January 2015.
- Member, American Philosophical Association, 2007–present.
- Member, ECOM, UNC, 2012–2014.
- Judge, Collegiate Ethics Bowl, 2008.
- MGAA Philosophy Department Liaison, UWM, 2007–2008.

References

Professional references available on request.